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  1
ABSTRACT 
 
The Protocol on the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted in 1998 and 
entered into force in 2004, is designed to reinforce the human rights protection that has 
been under the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The provisions of the 
Protocol are not clearly stipulated on points that deal with the salient procedural issues. 
This thesis explores the challenges that the Court will encounter in applying procedural 
rules and its role in addressing them. Of specific interest are the questions of which parties 
have the right of access to the Court, the right of individuals and NGOs to take a case to 
court, and related admissibility procedures. Further, the jurisdiction of the Court presents 
the Court with problems of definition. 
 
As a result, the central idea of the thesis attempts to unearth the challenges that the Court 
will come across in interpreting the doubtful provisions. The thesis argues and concludes 
that it is possible for the Court to address these issues in a proper manner and suggests that 
it should be judicially active in its interpretation to safeguard the protection of human rights 
in Africa. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
ACHPR      African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
AU             African Union 
ECHR        European Court of Human Rights 
EU             European Union 
IACHR      Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
ICJ             International Committee of Jurists 
NGOs        Non-Governmental Organisations 
OAS          Organisation of American States 
OAU         Organisation of African Unity 
UN            United Nations 
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1 General Background to the Human Rights Court 
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (here in after the Protocol) was adopted by 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) in Ouagadougou in June 1998. The Protocol had to wait for more than half a decade 
before it took effect as it was pending the approval of member states. It came into effect on 
25 January 2004 after ratification by fifteen nations of the African Union.1 The Protocol 
has thirty-five provisions, some of which deal with the major procedural rules of the 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (here in after the Court). 
 
The main research problem of this paper orbits around the very notion of the Court’s 
procedure, which is depicted in the Protocol. The central research idea of the thesis 
explores the challenges to be faced by the Court in applying salient procedural rules and 
it proposes a potential technique that the Court should opt for, in deciding a doubtful 
case. The two core questions the thesis addresses therefore are: 
(1)     What are the challenges that the Court will encounter in applying 
procedural rules? and, 
(2)     What are the remedial techniques available for the Court to safeguard 
the better protection of human rights?  
The body of the paper does not treat these questions separately. Rather, the paper will 
examine the problems over the whole body of the thesis. 
  
                                                 
1 International Freedom of Expression Exchange,  “Africa Ratifies Human Rights Court” in  
< http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/56594/?PHPSESSID=37b8f676 >, visited April 24, 2006. 
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While answering the main research questions, naturally other subsidiary points should also 
be discussed.  It is through elucidating subordinate questions that the thesis will highlight 
on the main problem. The following are but some of the issues that are considered. In all of 
these, the level of procedural safeguards and the role of the Court in the advancement of 
human rights protection will be explored. 
• How does a state party accept the jurisdiction of the court?  
• How does one have the right of access to the Court? 
• How do individuals and NGOs access the Court? 
• What are the procedural rules on admissibility?  
• What are the sources of law for the court?  
• What is the Court’s jurisdiction? 
• What should the Court (Judges) do to effectively safeguard the protection of 
human rights? 
 
1.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper focuses on the major procedural rules that should be followed when taking a 
case to the Court. By its very nature, the discussion will hence exclude a substantive 
dealing on human rights. On the part dealing with jurisdiction, the discussion will focus 
mainly on contentious jurisdiction, though it will try to be comprehensive and introduce 
other forms of jurisdiction too. It will show the lacunae that the new court will be faced on 
some procedural issues. In doing so, the following research methodologies have been 
followed: 
 
1.2.1 Legal Positivism:  
Positivism: is the salient methodology that this research will be following. Legal 
positivism “summarises a range of theories that focus upon describing the law as it is 
backed up by effective sanctions, with reference to formal criteria, independently of moral 
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or ethical considerations.”2 Thus, the paper will try to make analysis of the de lege lata 
instead of the de lege ferenda to reach into what the applicable law is. A tool that will be 
employed to elucidate the applicable law would be the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law 
of treaties. After finding the boundaries of the applicable law the paper will propose 
judicial activism, as a system that should be employed for an effective protection of human 
rights. 
 
 By using the positivist method, the analysis of the Court’s procedure requires a thorough 
study of several instruments. This does not indicate that other instruments will be 
eschewed; it only shows the level of emphasis. The instruments are 
- the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on June 
9, 1998. 
- the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted on June 27, 
1981. 
- the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the 
Union, Maputo, July 11 - August 13, 2003.  
- the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
adopted on October 6, 1995. 
- the Constitutive Act of the African Union: adopted in 2000 at the Lome Summit 
(Togo). 
 
1.2.2 Comparative Law Method:  
Comparative law is a method of the study of legal systems. The theory of comparative law 
research method puts in the forefront comparison itself, while comparative law is 
                                                 
2 ____________Symposium on Method in International Law: Appraising the Method of International Law: A 
Prospectus for Readers. (1999) 93 American J. Intl. Law p. 291. The symposium also describes New Haven 
School, International Legal Process, Critical Legal Studies, International law and international customs, 
Feminist Jurisprudence and Law and Economics as methods of research in international law. 
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frequently associated and even sometimes equated with a comparative study of different 
legal systems.3 This paper does not claim that there are legal systems established in the 
different regions within the human rights paradigm. As such, it will not attempt to fully 
employ the comparative law research method with all its technical meaning in the legal 
parlance.   
 
As a result, the research will employ a comparative approach by making a comparison with 
the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights when it is convenient. These 
two Courts came in to the international plane as regional enforcement mechanisms decades 
ago. The experience and practical application of the law in the area of pre-trial procedure 
will be investigated with a view to elucidate the rules of the African Court. In addition, it 
will be employed to see the level of protection that the African Court is empowered by way 
of its procedure. 
 
1.3 THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
 
The African Human Rights system was created by the Organisation of the African Unity 
(here in after OAU) currently the African Union (here in after AU)4 for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. The organisation was not keen to human rights in its early days. 
It took decades for the organisation to consider human rights as its main agenda and reach 
to the point it is today.5  
 
                                                 
3 Djalil I. Kiekbaev: Comparative Law: Method, Science or Educational Discipline? (2003), ECLJ vol. 7. 
available in  .<http://www.ejcl.org/73/art73-2.html>, September 29, 2005. 
4 The African Union is a successor of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was established on 
May 25,1963 by the then independent states of the continent. An Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in 
Sirte, Libya on 9 September 1999 called for the establishment of an African Union in conformity with the 
ultimate objectives of the OAU Charter. 
5 For analysis of the development of human rights in the Organisation of African Unity/African Union see, 
Rachel Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004)   
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The OAU Charter has not mentioned the term human rights with the exception of once 
mentioning the Universal Declaration of “Human Rights”.6 It stipulates the term under 
Article II(1)e where the Charter sets “the promotion of international cooperation with due 
regard to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. 
Accordingly, human rights were relegated as secondary by putting too much emphasis on 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.7  
 
Be it as it may, the missing link in the OAU Charter was implanted to fill the lacunae when 
the Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (here in after the Charter).8 The normative framework of human rights 
is substantiated by the addition of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child.9 Furthermore, the African Union summit in Maputo, Mozambique adopted the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa on July 11, 2003 to advance the rights of the women.10   
 
After setting the normative standards, the three treaties provide for measures of safeguard 
by creating an institutional framework for the promotion and protection of the substantive 
rights. Article 30 of the Charter provides for the establishment of an African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (here in after the Commission) within the OAU. The 
                                                 
6 Article 3(e) of the OAU charter. Freedom from colonialism is a human right. See Vincent Orlu Nmehielle, 
The African human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice and Instruments, The Hague/London/new York: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 2001. The notion of self determination and apartheid could also be considered as 
issues of human rights. See Rachel Murray, Supra, note 5. p. 7 
7 See the Preamble of the Charter of the OAU.  The OAU was known by many as the club of dictators for 
using sovereignty and non-interference as a shield for obligations in the violation of human rights. See also 
BBC News World Edition, “African Union to replace dictators’ club” 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2115736.stm> (visited 4 October 2005) 
8 Vincent O. Nmheille, Supra note 6, P. 82.  
9African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), adopted in 
July 1990 and entered into force November 29, 1999. 
10 The protocol will enter in force after it is ratified by fifteen states. As it stands now it needs two more states 
to ratify it. 
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promotion of human rights, the protection of human rights and the interpretation of the 
Charter are the three explicit mandates bestowed on the Commission.11
 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child has established an African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child to promote and protect the 
rights and welfare of the child.12 Article 32 of the African Child Charter directly 
reproduces the African Commission’s mandate defined under Article 45 of the African 
Human Rights Charter as a monitoring body. Apart from using the word Committee in 
place of the Commission, the new organ “in many respects duplicates the jurisdiction of the 
Commission”.13 The protective mandate of the recent human rights instrument, the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women, is 
predominantly entrusted to the respective states.14 The respective states have to submit 
periodic reports to the Commission as per Article 62 of the Human Rights Charter that 
indicates measures, inter alia, legislative measures undertaken for the full realization of the 
rights enshrined in the Women’s Protocol.15
 
Accordingly, the African Commission is the pillar of human rights promotion and 
protection in Africa, yet the practice does not always warrant it. In fact, the Commission 
has been only a useful tool for the promotion of human rights, but a largely ineffective 
mechanism for the protection of human rights.16 The African Commission was purposely 
created with “ineffective powers to fulfill its mandate of human rights protection.”17 The 
                                                 
11African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, Article 45.The commission has also to perform 
“other tasks” as may be given to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
12 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered 
into force Nov. 29, 1999, Article 32. 
13 Curtis F.J.Doebbler “A Complex Ambiguity: The Relationship Between the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and Other African Union Initiatives Affecting Respect for Human Rights”, 13 
Transnat’l L.& Contemp. Probs. 2003 P. 15 
14 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women, adopted by the 
Second Ordinary Session of the Union, Maputo, 11 July 2003. Article 26(1) 
15 Supra note 14. 
16 Wolfgang Benedek “The African Charter and the African  Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
How to make it more effective” (1993) 11 Netherlands Quarterly of a Human Rights p. 25 
17University of Pretoria, Centre for Human Rights, “African Human Rights System” 
<http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre_publications/ahrs/court.html#for> visited 28 September 2005. 
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fact that decisions are made unanimously and its decisions are mere recommendations 
without having any binding nature, are indicative of its ineffectiveness.18 The Charter 
under the protective mandate of the Commission was considered as a paper tiger, which 
vehemently forced some to look for an effective protective mechanism such as a Court.19 
The growing sense of inadequacy of the protection under the African Human Rights 
Commission has eventually called for the re-consideration of the idea of the Court in 
1994.20
 
1.4 THE AFRICAN COURT OF HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
 
The Charter was concluded in 1981 in Banjul, Gambia, under the auspices of the OAU for 
the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa.21 The Charter is the youngest of 
the regional human rights instruments. It has had a chance to refer to the previous human 
rights treaties and include the protection mechanisms of the two regions.  The European 
and the Inter-American systems have provided a Court as a protection mechanism.  
 
However, the African Human rights Charter does not provide for the establishment of a 
Court unlike its counter parts. Instead, it has provided for the establishment of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. As such, it was a calculated move by the 
drafters not to provide for the establishment of a court in the Charter.22  The discussion to 
include a court as part of the protection mechanism in the Charter did not have a majority 
support for this was considered to have an adverse effect on the sovereignty of African 
                                                 
18 Supra note 17. 
19 U. O. Umozurike, “The Protection of Human Rights Under the Banjul (African) Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights”, 1 African J. of Int’l L.  (1988) p. 82. 
20 Andreas O’shea “A critical reflection on the proposed African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 
(2001) African Human rights Law Journal p. 286. 
21 The Charter is also known as the Banjul Charter after the place of its adoption 
22 International Federation for Human Rights, “10 Keys to understand and use the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: A user’s guide for victims of human rights violations in Africa and human rights 
defenders”, <http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/COUR_AF_ANGLcadre.pdf > 
visited, September 22,2005. The guide depicts that the question of the creation of a jurisdictional institution 
was raised and it was dismissed as pointless.
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nations, which they were keen to preserve.23  Thus the mandate of human rights protection 
along with promotion was entrusted to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.  Seventeen years have passed since the adoption of the Charter, for the Court’s 
Protocol to come in to the plane. 
The adoption of the Protocol and its further ratification by fifteen states thereby making it 
enforceable breaks new ground for strengthening the African human rights system. The 
establishment of the Court is considered as a necessary prerequisite for the fulfillment of 
human rights in Africa by making the protection of human rights barely made under the 
Commission successful.24 The very reason for the creation of the Court supports this 
assertion. The preamble of the Protocol reads that “the attainment of the objectives of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples` Rights requires the establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples` Rights to complement and reinforce the functions of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples` Rights.” Thus, it incorporates the fact that the 
Commission was not successful in fulfilling its protective mandate. The protective mandate 
of human rights was mainly the business of the African Human Rights Commission. 
However, under the new framework the Court will reinforce the protective mandate of the 
Commission. The Commission will continue to be the sole institution concerned with the 
promotion of human rights in Africa. The protective mandate is now to be shared with the 
Court. The relationship of the two organs is explicitly addressed in the Protocol, “the Court 
will complement the protective mandate of the Commission.”25  Yet the relationship that 
the two organs will have in the protection of human rights is not so clear.26  
As the establishment of the Court is not yet materialized, the Commission is still the sole 
institution for both the promotion and the protection of human rights on the continent. This 
situation militates against the very reason for the creation of the Court, which is the 
                                                 
23 Supra note 19. 
24 Supra note 17. 
25 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted in June 1998 in Ouagadougou, entered into force on 25th 
January 2004, Article 2. 
26 See Ibrahim Ali Badawi Elsheikh “The future relationship between the African Court and the African 
Commission ” (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 2 p. 252-260 
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inadequate protection under the Commission. It has been long since the required 
ratification is fulfilled. The establishment of the Court has not yet been made practical. It is 
difficult to foresee when the Court will actually start to function, pending the political will 
of the AU and the high contracting parties. The decision of the African Heads of State to 
merge the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights with the African Court of Justice 
should be mentioned as a hurdle in the process of the establishment. While the Court’s 
institutionalisation as a separate and distinct institution from the African Court of Justice 
was pronouncedly decided27, a latter decision overruled this one and brought the idea of 
merger on to the plane28. One cannot be sure that the idea of merger is the sole reason for 
the delay; nonetheless one cannot also deny its causal relationship to some degree.   
 
Despite that, it is worth mentioning some major developments with regard to the 
establishing process of the Court. The African Heads of State and Heads of Government 
summit held in Khartoum, in January 2006 has made an important stride on this. The AU 
assembly has decided on the appointment of judges of the Court made by the Executive 
Council of the AU.29 Thus, two female and nine male judges from eleven countries have 
been appointed.30 The assembly has also decided on the seat of the Court on a regional 
level. Previously, when the major AU institutions were assigned a location for headquarter; 
the Eastern Region of the continent was assigned to host the African Court of Justice. 
Although the Protocol under Article 25 puts that the seat of the Court will be in a place 
determined by the assembly from among states parties to the Protocol, there seems a little 
option with the merger of the Courts decided in advance. In principle it would have been 
possible for the seat of the Court to be in any quarter of the continent where there is 
accession to the treaty and subsequent decision by the assembly. The decision to merge the 
two Courts has made this situation qualified in a regional classification.  
 
                                                 
27 Decision on the Draft Protocol of the Court of Justice, Doc. EX/CL/59 (111) / 58 (111), para 2  
28 Decision on the Merger of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of Justice of the 
African Union, – Assembly/AU/6(V). Dec/83(V) 
29 Decision on the Election of Judges of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights – (Doc. 
EX.CL/241 (VIII)) Assembly/AU/Dec. 100 (VI) 
30 Supra note 27.  See also Supra note 25, Article 11. 
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Moreover, the assembly has made this clear through its decision that the seat of the Court 
shall be in the eastern region.31 There are thirteen countries in the eastern Africa region 
which are Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.32 There are twenty three countries that 
ratified and deposited the instrument of ratification with the AU and only the following six 
are from the eastern Africa region: Comoros, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda. 33  By virtue of their ratification of the Court’s Protocol, it is only these six 
countries that are eligible candidates for any decision on the seat of the Court of Justice and 
the Court of Human Rights. 
 
While the Human Rights Court’s relationship with the Commission and its merger with the 
Court of Justice are undeniably important and worthy of discussion, they are not the central 
themes in this research. That does not mean a discussion related to the main thesis of the 
research, that may call up on these issues will be relegated. Unavoidably, the paper will try 
to touch up on one or more of these issues with out directly addressing these concepts. 
Consequently, the paper will try to focus on the research questions that it tries to address as 
described here in above. 
 
1.5 THE PROCEDURE OF THE COURT 
 
Courts at all levels have specific rules of procedure that they follow. The rules of procedure 
are designed to make the proceeding civilised, orderly, economical and efficient. It goes 
without saying that the African Human Rights Court has one or will have one in this 
                                                 
31 Supra note 26. 
32Resolution on the Division of Africa into Five Regions. CM/Res. 464 (XXVI) See also AU Profile at < 
http://www.iss.co.za/af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/auprof.htm > visited 18 January 2006.
33African Union, “List of Countries which have signed, ratified/ acceded to the African Union Convention on 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ on the Establishment of the African Court of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights” in  < http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/Protocol%20on%20the%20African%20Court%20on%20Human
%20and%20Peoples%20Rights.pdf > visited June 28, 2006  
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respect. Whilst, the detailed rules that emanate from the salient one’s will be made 
available in the rules of procedure,34 the general rules in connection with the Court’s 
procedure are depicted in the Protocol. 
 
These procedures are rules that should be followed without touching up on the merits of the 
case always35. Thus, they involve issues related to access, admissibility, jurisdiction and 
judgment which purely focus on the Court’s procedure. This paper is all about this and 
does not put itself to any substantive discussion in detail. It will be making a discussion on 
the major procedural rules that emanate from the Protocol. The discussion will primarily 
centre on the procedural issues that should be fulfilled before the Court indulges into the 
merit of the case, thus, it will exclude the discussion on procedures related to judgement. 
There are three fundamental concerns that one should first look into considering a Courts 
procedure before it fully embarks on the substantive issues involved in a case. One should 
look (i) if the applicant has access to the Court, standing, (ii) if the case is accepted for 
consideration, admissibility and (iii) if the Court has the power to adjudicate it, jurisdiction. 
All are predominantly pre-trial issues, meaning that they should be considered primarily 
before the case is being tried. However, standing and admissibility are matters related to 
the acceptability of the case while jurisdiction is the Court’s power to try it. A problem 
with one or more of these will make the trial ineffective, hence any argument against these 
procedural issues should always be presented first as a preliminary objection to the Court. 
A number of relevant treaties are set forth in many international and regional human rights 
instruments for the protection of the rights of individuals and groups. The establishment of 
the OAU/AU was a milestone in fostering the international and regional initiatives for 
making a great many substantive rights protected in one way or another. Yet, it is seldom 
that individuals from Africa seek protection under these mechanisms. One of the reasons 
                                                 
34 Supra note 25. The Protocol, in different places, indicates that the detailed rules for the implementation of 
the general rules are going to be inclufded in the Rules of Procedure that the Court will design. See for 
Example Articles 8 & 10. 
35 It should be noted that some procedural issues such as admissibility involve substantive issues. 
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for this is the lack of procedural rules that are designed with a view to foster the protection 
of human rights.  
 
The substantive rules that are endowed with a monitoring organ should be complemented 
with a procedure that allows the smooth functioning of the monitoring body. It should also 
be designed in a manner that advances the protection of human rights further. The existence 
of a Court by itself does not hence warrant that an individual person or an NGO has a right 
to present its communication. It does not warrant the acceptance of any communication 
made. It also does not secure that the Court has power to consider the case submitted to it 
as it pleases. There are some hurdles that should be passed as per the procedural rules of 
the Court. 
 
 
1.6 BASIC FRAMEWORK AND CENTRAL IDEA OF THE THESIS 
 
This paper will argue that there are too many gaps left in the Protocol related to the Court’s 
procedure. The lacuna will be filled through the Court’s Rules of Procedure36 or its 
interpretation. The Court should not create a new obligation for the states by way of the 
rules of procedure or interpretation. It has to remain with in its bound in applying 
obligations that are express or implicit. Nevertheless, the Court is empowered to take 
decisions that could swing to limit or advance the protection of human rights based on the 
interpretation it will follow. A smooth application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties37 may not at times help affirmatively as some gray areas will always be there.38 
Whenever that is possible, the paper will make an interpretative analysis which would 
                                                 
36 Supra note 25, Article 33.  
37 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Signed at Vienna 23 May 1969, Entry into Force: 27 January 
1980 
38 Paul Mahony writes “Some clauses are so closely defined that the scope for gap-filling through 
interpretation and, consequently, for evolution is minimal.” Paul Mahony “Judicial Activism and Judicial 
self-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two seides of the Same Coin.”, 11 Hum. Rts. L. J.  
(1990) p. 57. 
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make the effective protection of the rights progressive. Yet that is not always the case in the 
Court’s procedure.  
 
Different ways of interpretation of the Court’s Protocol has been made by different writers 
and none of them can be said to be logically erroneous. It is in the middle of such doubt 
that the judge should locate his role in finding, and not making the law. The Court has to be 
involved in “a creative analysis of discovering rational and connected purposes, policies, 
and principles that are expressed, either implicitly or explicitly, in the law.”39 Thus a 
judicial activist role would be greatly demanded from the Court and its judges in drawing 
the rules of procedure, its interpretation and applying them to specific cases.  
 
It should be noted once again, however, that the Court should not exceed its legitimate role 
of interpretation and transgress into the realm of policy-making.40 The European Court of 
Human Rights for example has come up with two creative methods of interpretation to 
safeguard and enhance the rights guaranteed by the convention: the “living instrument” and 
the “practical and effective” doctrine.41 This way of interpretation has been applied by the 
European Court to safeguard substantive rights. In so doing the European Court “has 
generally struck a fair balance between judicial innovation and respect for the ultimate 
policy-making role of member States in determining the spectrum of rights guaranteed by 
the Convention”.42  
 
Consequently, there is and will arise a need for the African Court to interpret the Charter 
and apply it to the very purpose it was meant for. “Lack of judicial activism in the 
interpretation of the African Charter” has been pointed out as one of the problems that 
affect the domestic impact of the African Human Rights System.43 Thus the problem has 
                                                 
39 Bojan Bugaric,”Courts as Policy-Makers: Lessons from Transition” 42 Harv. Int’l L. J. (2001) p. 279 
40 Alastair Mowbray, “The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights” 5 Human Rights Law Review 
(2005) p. 58 
41 Supra note 40, pp. 60-78. 
42 Supra note 40, p.79 
43 Pan African Judicial Colloquium: The African Human Rights System and the International Court. 
Johannesburg, South Africa, 19-20 November, 2004. A narrative Report p.11 
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been identified and there is a chance for the African Court to learn from the innovative 
interpretation of its European counterpart. As a result there should be no reason that the 
African Human Rights Court could not come up with ways of procedural interpretation that 
will uphold the protection of the rights in the Charter. Hence, a loose judicial activism that 
would be used to interpret a certain loophole in a manner that will promote the protection 
of human rights in Africa further will be recommended. 
 
Paul Mahony’s writing on the European Court of Human Rights summarises the need for 
judicial activism, albeit as part of making the law, in the following manner44
The very indeterminacy of language has as a consequence that no legal text, however detailed, can 
have a wholly precise meaning or determinate range of application. The core meaning or central 
range of application may well be reasonably clear and settled but the borderline cases, those in the 
penumbra of doubt, will require the exercise of judicial discretion. In hard cases a court may well 
have to arbitrate between several quite plausible decisional alternatives. The existence of this judicial 
choice means that the judge cannot be regarded as having a purely neutral role as discoverer and 
enforcer of the law but as being an active participant in the law-making process. 
Judicial activism in the sense of making new law is therefore inevitable, albeit confined to filling the 
interstices left in the fabric of the law by existing sources. 
 
The writer of this paper is aware of the dangers of judicial activism in that it may make the 
Court unpredictable and ambivalent. Yet it is the writer’s belief that human rights cases 
should be approached with more activism45 but done so objectively. Thus there should be a 
limit to it that its application should be sought only when the conventional ways of judicial 
application are not going to help in clearing the confusion. On this note the former Chief 
Justice of India has to say the following:46
Judicial Activism is a delicate exercise involving creativity. Great skill and dexterity is required for 
innovation. Judicial creativity is needed to fill the void occasioned by any gap in the law or inaction 
of any other functionary, and, thereby, to implement the Rule of Law, Diversion from the traditional 
course must be made only to the extent necessary to activate the concerned [] authorities to discharge 
                                                 
44 Supra note 38. 
45 See supra note 39. 
46 Justice J. S. Verma “Protecting Human Rights Through the Judicial Process” Second Justice M. 
Hidayatullah Memorial Lecture in  the National Human Rights Commission, New Delhi, India, 21 December 
2002. 
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their duties and not to usurp their role. The credibility of the judicial process must not get 
eroded…..The need is to practise self-restraint and to innovate or forge new tools only when that is 
the requirement of public good and no other method is available. 
 
As such this paper recommends the role of judicial activism only in cases where there is an 
extreme demand for doing justice and when the ‘traditional course’ of applying the law is 
not unequivocal. The structure depicted for the African Human Rights Court does not make 
one sceptical that the Court will abuse its power in applying activism.47  In the light of the 
provided background, the subsequent chapters will deal with the subsidiary problems 
aforementioned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 See Articles 11 and the following in the Protocol. The rules here provide the composition of the Court and 
its independence. The quality of the judges and the Court’s institutional structure (independence) are designed 
in such a way that any role of activism will not be abused by it.  
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2  ACCESS TO THE COURT 
 
 Access to the Court in relation to the judicatory power of the Court is granted to 
institutions and individuals based on two sets of arrangements: compulsory and optional.  
This Chapter will discuss the compulsory arrangement while the next will take on the 
optional one. The chapter describes the rules of the Protocol to highlight on problematic 
points in interpretation. 
 
Paragraph 1 under article 5 of the Protocol lists institutions that are entitled to submit cases 
to the Court. These are: 
a. The Commission; 
b. The State Party which has lodged a complaint to the Commission; 
c. The State Party against which the complaint has been lodged at the commission; 
d. The State Party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation; 
e. African Intergovernmental Organisations.  
 
These institutions have the right to directly access the Court. For these entities, the right to 
access the Court is not dependent on any additional process apart from due ratification of 
the Protocol. Hence it is compulsory. But there still remains a question whether or not these 
bodies can access the Court directly or not. The institutions mentioned above can be broken 
down into three. As such only the Commission, the State Party and African 
Intergovernmental Organisations are automatically recognised to access the Court. The 
following sections will explain the form of access given to these institutions. 
 
2.1 THE COMMISSION 
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The word Commission in the Protocol refers to the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights which was established by virtue of the African Human Rights Charter.48 
The existence of the Commission predated the coming in to being of the Court’s Protocol. 
The Commission has been a quasi-judicial institution with a mandate to promote and 
protect the Charter. The creation of the Court is not, however, a power usurpation from the 
Commission. Article 2 of the Protocol defines the relationship between the two. It says the 
Court should “complement the protective mandate of the Commission.” The relationship 
between the two is set out in the Protocol generally but not clearly. Therefore, a question 
would arise as to what will be the relationship of the two in handling cases. The rules of 
procedure49 will detail how a case should be handled by the Court; it should also outline 
the complementary relationship that should exist between the two in connection with 
handling cases. One question that begs the answer is; when does the Commission submit a 
case to the Court?  
 
The Commission, as it stands, is the lone institutional structure in Africa that monitors the 
African Charter. Under the Charter, the Commission is given power to consider 
communications from both individuals and States. The submission of Communications to 
the Commission is still, and will for the foreseeable future, continue to be the major stage 
that individuals could resort to.50 The Commission’s decision on the Communication’s 
submitted to it is a mere recommendation.51 However, by its very nature the Court’s 
decision is mandatory and the Commission would be very much encouraged to submit 
cases to the Court so that it can secure a binding decision.  
 
While the access accorded to the Commission is beyond contest, there seems to be a 
difference in the view of writers on how the Commission would submit cases to the Court. 
                                                 
48 Supra note 25 Article 2. 
49 Article 33 of the Protocol indicates that the Rules of Procedure will be drawn up by the Court in 
consultation with the Commission. 
50 Only one state has made the optional declaration for submission of a case to the African Human Rights 
Court.  
51 Supra note 11, Article 45 (1)a 
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When comparing the African Court its European equivalent, Rachel Murray addresses the 
issue in the following manner:52
Article 8 of the Protocol on the African Court requires that Rules of the Court should indicate 
when cases should be brought before it ‘bearing in mind the complementarity between the 
Commission and the Court’. This would appear to suggest that the African Court will only 
consider cases which have already been considered by the Commission, thus following the 
approach of the previous European organs. Prior to the adoption of Protocol 11 to the 
European Convention, the European Commission looked at admissibility, would try to reach a 
friendly settlement, and then reported if there was a breach. It would send the case to the 
Committee of Ministers to be enforced, or it could choose to submit the case to the Court, if the 
state concerned had accepted its jurisdiction. 
 
This would mean that the Commission would first consider the case submitted to it by 
individuals or others allowed to submit to it under the existing procedure. After the 
deliberations are made, the Commission would aptly submit the case to the Court. This line 
of argument is not fully taken by all alike. Frans Viljoen summarises how the Commission 
could take a case to the Court and adds two more possibilities to the above one in the 
following manner.53  
 Since the Protocol does not explicitly require that the African commission make findings on 
the admissibility and merits of a case before submitting it to the African Court, three 
possibilities present themselves. First, the African Commission may submit a case to the 
African Court without making any findings at all. Second, it could submit a case after making 
some findings, for example, after it had made a finding of fact, a finding on admissibility, or 
after unsuccessfully trying to negotiate a friendly settlement. Finally, the African Commission 
could submit a case to the African Court after its final disposition, i.e., a finding on the merits 
or a friendly settlement. 
 
 
 The access given to the Commission is a meaningful one considering the practical 
situation in Africa. Without the states allowing the individuals to take a case against them 
                                                 
52 Rachel Murray: A Comparison between the African and the European Courts of Human Rights; African 
Human Rights Law Journal. Vol 2 no 2 (2002) p.198. The italics is added for emphasis by the writer of this 
paper. 
53 Frans Viljon, A Human Rights Court for Africa, and Africans. 30 Brook. J. Int’l L. (2004/2005) p. 25 
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in the Court, there will be no meaningful enforcement.54 However, the right of access 
accorded to the Commission in a way rectifies this situation and saves the Protocol from 
being a mere white elephant project. As such, the Commission is expected to be the 
forearm that plays a pivotal role in the protection of individual rights in Africa, at least by 
taking cases to the Court.  
 
A compromise should be sought on how the Commission could submit a case to the Court 
for reasons dealt here in below. A feasible working solution should be sought to the strong 
claims made by the writers mentioned here in above. The writer of this paper submits the 
following on how the Commission submits a case to the Court. 
  
According to Murray, it appears that it is automatic for the Commission to submit a case 
after it first makes a consideration. It is understood that the view held here is that all cases 
that are submitted to the Commission will be automatically submitted to the Court. On the 
other hand, Viljoen asserts the Commission would submit a case to the Court in three 
situations. It could do so acting as a waterway, after making some findings or after a final 
disposition by it. While both views could not be left aside totally for sake of theoretical 
arguments, it does not seem to be as pragmatic as it appears. 
 
As put by Murray, the rules of the Court should be designed with a strict allegiance to the 
complementary principle which is set out more than once in the Protocol.55 If the 
Commission has to submit all cases, it may be taken that the Commission might even 
submit cases that are decided by it with no problem directed from the State. This analysis, 
if it is right, will make the Commission obsolete in its function with respect to States 
Parties to the Court’s Protocol. Moreover, it would be meaningless for the Commission to 
                                                 
54 The other option is for states to submit cases against another state. In the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights there were only two cases submitted until 1990. See Frans Viljon supra note 53. See also Rachel 
Murray note 5.  She quotes RCW White ‘Tackling Political Disputes through individual application.’ (1998) 
1 European Human Rights Law Review 66 that states are reluctant to submit cases in the Strasburg Court. If 
individuals are not allowed due to the inhibition imposed by the states on them and if states do not submit 
cases for fear of the diplomatic and political consequences that the case might ensue, it would be difficult to 
see the feasibility of the Court in enforcing the rights. 
55 See the Preamble and Articles 2 and 8 of the Protocol. 
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submit a case which does not reasonably show any adverse behaviour from the part of the 
state in implementing the recommendation. Seconding that, the principle of 
complementarity would be affected negatively if there is a procedure that compels the 
Commission to submit all cases after a fact finding process which would take some time. 
Why would the Commission submit a case to the Court if there is no dispute on its 
recommendation? 
 
It would be unrealistic for the Commission to submit a case which is already disposed. It 
would defy the function of the Commission if the Commission is set to submit all the cases 
that are brought to it. Doing so would not add anything to the principle of complementarity 
and mutual reinforcement. At the outset, the Commission should not submit any case that is 
totally disposed by it. It should deal with the cases that are submitted to it as it used to do, 
separately, with out considering the existence of the Court. After that, the Commission 
could submit cases that are disposed by it and on which there is reluctance on the part of 
the state to accept its recommendation. On this point the Commission would like to have a 
strong force on its decision by securing a binding decision. This approach would limit the 
number of cases that goes to the Court and contribute to the complementarity principle.  
 
2.2 THE STATE PARTY 
 
All member states of the African Union have now ratified the Charter, which is the parent 
instrument for human rights protection in Africa. Less than half of the members have 
ratified the additional Protocol on the establishment of the Court. As stated elsewhere the 
Commission has the mandate for both the protection and promotion of human rights. Its 
protective mandate is now shared by the Human Rights Court.56 However, it should be 
noted that it is still the sole institute for the protection of the Charter in more than half of 
the countries of the continent.  
 
                                                 
56 Supra note 52.  
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All states of the union can take cases against another state to the Commission by virtue of 
being a party to the human rights Charter. Article 5(1) b and c of the Protocol deal with the 
situation where the complaint is made by a state party. A State Party can lodge a complaint 
against another State Party since it is only states that can be defendants to the proceeding. 
A State Party which has ratified the Protocol can be brought to the Court on one or more of 
the violation of rights protected by the Charter and other relevant human rights instruments.  
 
Thus, states that have already made an application and the ones against which an 
application was lodged at the Commission, do have a right to access the Court by 
presenting an application or presenting a defence to it.57 A state also has a right to access 
the Court when its citizen is a victim of human rights violation.58 When a state is called to 
defend a case in a Court it can object the authority of the Court by claiming that the Court 
does not have the power to look into the case because it lacks jurisdiction ratione personae. 
59 A jurisdiction ratione personae is the equivalent of two principles: personal jurisdiction 
and standing.60 A personal jurisdiction is the passive sense of ratone personae where a 
state can be brought as a respondent, on the other hand, standing is the active sense of the 
term that allows a state to have the locus standi of bringing a case in a court.61 Thus, a 
respondent state can defend itself by claiming that it cannot be brought as a defendant 
because the Court does not have the personal jurisdiction on it. It can also defend by 
claiming that the applicant state does not have a standing in the court. 
 
 
2.2.1 Personal jurisdiction 
 
                                                 
57 Supra note 25, Article 5(1)b and c 
58 Supra note 25, Article 5(1)d 
59 Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter American Court of Human Rights.(Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press)2003, P. 97. 
60 Supra note 59.. 
61 Supra note 59. 
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The question that should be asked here is how a state can be required to stand as 
respondent. The Human Rights Court in Africa is a result of a supra-national arrangement 
i.e. a convention; there should be an unequivocal situation where the state has duly 
consented to the respective instrument. The consent of a state can be expressed in many 
ways: signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, or by any other means if so agreed.62 As such, an African state can be brought 
before the African Court of Human Rights as a respondent only when that particular state 
has consented to the jurisdiction of that Court to adjudicate cases that involves violation of 
rights by that state.  
 
 The process of giving consent under the Protocol is clearly indicated under Article 34 of 
the Protocol. The Protocol is open for “signature and ratification or accession” by any State 
Party to the Charter.63 This statement has two points to make. One, the process of 
providing consent by a state requires two stages; the first one is signature and the second 
one is ratification or accession. Two, those states that can sign and ratify or accede to the 
Protocol are those states that are parties to the Charter.  
(I) Expression of Consent by States: Signature, ratification and accession are the primary 
rules that are required for a state to give its consent. The consent of a state to be bound by a 
treaty can be given in the form of a signature alone.64 However, signature alone does not 
make the grade to deduce the consent of a state in the case of the Court’s Protocol. One can 
neither be sure if signature is a necessary prerequisite and what its effects are if not 
followed by ratification or accession to it. Definitely it cannot be considered as one that 
makes the state subject to the treaty’s jurisdiction. It can only be considered as the 
expression of the state’s interest and not consent. The representative in this case would sign 
the treaty subject to future ratification or accession by the state according to the procedures 
                                                 
62 Supra note 37, Article 11 
63 Supra note 25, Article 34 (1) 
64 Supra note 37,  Article  12 
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of ratification that are regulated by that particular state.65 Such a signature however entails 
an obligation on the state “to refrain from acts which would defeat the object or purpose of 
a treaty.”66  
 
The Protocol was adopted on 9 June 1998 and on the same day 33 states have put their 
signature to it.67 At this time the treaty itself was not in force. By June 2006, out of the 
possible 53 African states, 47 have signed while 23 of them had ratified and deposited their 
instrument of ratification.68 The signature by the qualified majority of states indicates that 
these states’ “desire to abide by the spirit of the treaty and will do nothing to undermine or 
subvert it.”69 As such it imposes a negative obligation on the states that have signed the 
treaty. They might not be required to do something positively; nevertheless they should 
also refrain from doing some thing that would tamper with the object and purpose of the 
treaty. Hence, the subsequent requirement for binding the state completely should be 
fulfilled for it to be obligatory. Thus the provisions of the treaty are not going to be 
applicable to that particular state before the treaty is enforce on that state. 
 
Consequently, the second requirement of ratification or accession should be made for a 
state to duly authorise the application of the treaty on it. By definition ratification and 
accession are equivalent in that both mean a process through which the state establishes on 
the international plane that it be bound by the treaty.70 Ratification and accession generally 
require a deliberation by either the law making body or by the body authorised to approve 
the conclusion of such treaties. The first country that ratified the treaty on 29 September 
1998 was Senegal.71 While the ratification or accession is a step forward to make the treaty 
                                                 
65 Supra note 37, Article 7 and 14 (1) c 
66 Supra note 37, Article 18(a) 
67Supra note 33. 
68 Supra note 33. 
69 N Barney Pityana, “The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Municipal Law”, paper presented 
in , Seminar for Eastern and Southern African States on the Ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; 
Organised by Interights, London; Gaborone, Botswana,  9-12 December 2003. p. 2 
 
70 Supra note 37, Article 2(1)b. 
71 Supra note 33. 
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binding it is not the final point. As the treaty is a new one not yet enforce, it does not bind 
one country even if such country fulfils all the requirements to make it binding on it. In 
connection with this, the Protocol makes some more requirements to be fulfilled. However 
one should take note of the fact that the negative obligations that are raised in connection 
with the states that signed the treaty are also applicable here until the treaty is in force.72
 
A state that signed and ratified or acceded to the treaty does not bind itself immediately, at 
least in the case of the Court’s Protocol. It would naturally be difficult for a state to know 
whether or not another state has ratified or acceded to a treaty. Such would be challenging 
when a problem that involves the treaty ensues among some states. That is why most, if not 
all, treaties have depositaries.73 Accordingly the Secretary-General of the OAU/AU is the 
depository for the additional Protocol; states shall deposit their instruments of ratification 
or accession to the office.74 The deposit of the ratification or accession of the states consent 
is not often made on the same day as the place of the ratification and the place to deposit it 
might not be the same. For example, the first ratification made on the 29th day of 
September had to stay for a month, until October 30, 1999 to be deposited at the 
depository. At first the fulfilments of all these do not even make the treaty fully binding on 
the state. A treaty is an agreement between states under international law; it often puts a 
minimum number of ratifications or deposit of ratifications for such a treaty to be in force. 
Before the coming into force of the treaty it is not possible to think the binding nature of 
the Protocol on a particular state with the fullest sense of the word. As such the Protocol on 
the establishment of the African Court has made a deposit of fifteen ratifications and a 
lapse of thirty days for the Protocol to take effect.75 The deposit of the 15th ratification was 
made by Comoros on 26/12/2003, bringing the Protocol into effect only a month latter on 
25/01/2004.76  
                                                 
72 Supra note 37, Article 18 (b)  
73 Supra note 37, Article 77. One of the purposed of the depositories is to communicate the coming into force 
of a treaty and also communicate the parties to it from time to time.  
74 Supra note 25, Article 34(2) The OAU is now substituted by the AU because the rights and obligations of 
the defunct organisation are now transferred to the AU. 
75 Supra note 25, Article 34(3). 
76.Supra note 33. 
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 In a nutshell, the Protocol requires the following steps for states to be bound by the 
provisions of the treaty. First, the particular state has to sign the treaty through its 
representative. Second, such intention of the State should be supported by a ratification or 
accession from the state organ that is authorised to enter into such treaty. Third, a 
ratification or accession by a state should be deposited at the Secretary-General of the 
OAU/AU. At last, fifteen deposits and a thirty days expiry after the deposit of the last one 
will bring the document into effect. This will make the coming into existence of the 
document as part of the body of international law and binding on states.  
 
Some states that would make a latter day deposit of their ratification or accession will be 
governed by other rules. Such states do not need to stay one month after the ratification is 
deposited. The document is already in force by then and they would be aware if they 
deposit their ratification or accession that the treaty would be immediately applicable. 
Thus, a state that makes a deposit of ratification of the Protocol would be bound by the 
provisions of the Protocol on the same day as the date of the deposit.  
 
Nevertheless, it does not seem to be realistic to assume the applicability of the Protocol 
before the establishment of the Court. Although the deposit of fifteen ratifications and the 
lapse of thirty days brought the Protocol in force, it is difficult to see the application of the 
Protocol on the personal jurisdiction of a state. Thus, it would be difficult for anyone with a 
locus standi to bring a case against another state when the institution that will consider the 
case is not in place. Yet the fact that the treaty is in force paves the way for the 
enforcement of the treaty. The Protocol for the establishment of the Human Rights Court is 
now in force. It is not, however, possible for one country to bring a case against another for 
the simple reason that there is no Court physically available. However, as it paves the way 
for the implementation of the treaty, the judges of the Court are elected and the seat of the 
court is known at least on a regional level.  
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A State Party to the Protocol would then be bound by the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
without being required to make a separate declaration on the subject. Acceptance of 
compulsory jurisdiction will allow others to bring cases against that particular state. This 
situation is summarised by Ouguergouz in the following manner;77
Every State Party to the Protocol may be brought before the Court by the African 
commission, a state party or by an African inter governmental organization, without 
it needing to give its consent either by the prior deposit of a declaration of 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court or in any other way: the 
jurisdiction of the Court is compulsory for it solely requires accession to the 
Protocol. In the Inter American system the jurisdiction of the Court is optional, this 
was also the case in the European system prior to the entry into force of Protocol No 
11.which made this jurisdiction compulsory regardless of the status of the author of 
the complaint. 
 
The acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction may be made on an ad hoc basis for 
the adjudication of a particular case based on an agreement.78 The Protocol on the African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights however does not have such arrangement. Thus any 
member state can either be a party to the Court’s Protocol or not. The Protocol by itself 
does not have an opt-out clause. A State Party that may want to do away with its 
international obligation should follow the procedure in the AU Constitutive Act. The 
Charter and hence the Protocol are treaties that are brought up with in the OAU/AU. It 
appears that a state should be a member of the AU to be a party to the treaties promulgated 
with in the union.79 The other option is to give a notice for one year by following the rules 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.80  
 
                                                 
77 Fatsah Ouguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for 
Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa. (2003) The Hague, London, New York,  Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, p. 725 
78 American Convention on Human Rights, Adopted at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human 
Rights, San José, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, Article 63(3)  
79 See Supra note 11, the Preamble and Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted at Lome, Togo, on the 
11th day of July 2000, entered into force May 2001. Article31. 
80 Supra note 37, Articles 65 and 67. 
 29
(II) States Parties to the Protocol: It is mentioned above that the Protocol is open for 
signature only for States Parties to the Charter.81 One should identify the Charter and the 
States that are parties to it so that the domain for the ratification of the Protocol is known. 
The Problem is worse when one considers the fact that the word Charter is used in both the 
African ‘Charter’ on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the ‘Charter’ of the Organisation of 
the African Unity. It might be difficult if the usage of the word, as in the preamble, had 
continued throughout the body of the Protocol. Even then the problem would have been 
solved because of the fact that all member states of the OAU/AU are also parties to the 
Human Rights Charter. One cannot be certain if a state will not opt out of the Human 
Rights Charter. For fear of such problem a saviour provision, article 2 of the Protocol, 
makes an assertion. It points out that the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is 
substituted with “the Charter” in the Protocol. As such the states that can be parties to the 
Protocol are those states that have ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, which are also the states that were parties to the OAU and are now parties to the 
AU.  
 
2.2.2 Standing 
 
Standing means the State Party should have a legally acceptable position in the African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. The State Party has to make a due ratification for it 
to have a legal standing. If the state has ratified the Protocol it automatically has a standing 
in the Court; that means it can bring cases in the Court. The question is then, against whom 
or against which institutions? The only parties that can stand as a defendant in the Court are 
States. The states are the sole bodies enshrined with the obligation to enforce that 
international human rights law, and of course the African Human Rights Charter, are 
implemented accordingly. The failure to implement or establish a due mechanism for the 
fulfilment of the obligation entails state responsibility. For a stronger reason, the violation 
of one or more of the protected rights will bring the responsibility of the state into the 
                                                 
81 Supra note 25, Article 34 (1) 
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plane. A state may hence bring a case to remedy the violation of one or more of the 
protected rights.  
 
As a result, it should be noted that when a state decides to take a case in the Court, it will 
certainly do it against another state. This might have a farther reaching consequence than it 
may look like. The political consequence that might ensue as a result of such an application 
is to be looked in the future. Yet one can undoubtedly say that the number of instances that 
such a case might be brought to the Court will not be a good deal. It is only a small number 
of cases that are brought against states to international tribunals.82 One could say there are 
reasons for this. Such an act might result in a conflicting situation between countries. On 
top of that a diplomatic solution is a better option in the case of states relationship than the 
purely legalistic approach. 
 
We have looked seen that the states right of access to the Court can be fulfilled when a 
state has lodged a complaint against another or when there is a complaint lodged against it 
in the Commission. According to the Protocol, the states right of access does not seem to 
be limited to these two cases. Paragraph 1 c of Article 5 in the Protocol indicates that a 
state has a right of access to the Court when its citizens are victims of a human rights 
violation.  
 
From the outset we can clear that a communication is going to be brought against another 
state. It is only states that can stand as defendants and if the country which is a citizen of 
the victim can access the court, it should be clear that it can not be against itself. If it is to 
bring a case against another state then it should be a party to the Protocol so that it can have 
a standing. This would make the provision superfluous. If a state has an established right to 
access the Court by virtue of being a party to the Protocol, why should it be entitled to have 
access again when its citizen is a victim of a rights violation? While an affirmative 
argument for the puzzle is possible, its strength does not seem to be plausible.  
                                                 
82 See Jo. M. Pascualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter –American Court of Human Rights, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2003) P. 103.  
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Consequently, one would ask what the purpose of the provision is going to be? There are 
two ways in which the state (which is a country of citizen to the victim) can be involved. 
First, when the individual victim has made an application to the Court, the victim’s country 
of nationality may access the Court. In this case the country, under the jurisdiction of which 
the victim suffered a human rights violation, should have made a declaration accepting 
individual complaints for violations committed in that state. Second, when there is an inter-
state complaint, the complaint can be brought by a state other than the victim’s country of 
citizenship. In such a case the country of the victim’s citizenship may have a right of access 
to the Court too. Such an access could be through making a request to join the applicant 
country by showing that it has interest in the case.83 This way of access however does not 
help in comprehending the analysis. For a state party to submit a case to the Court it should 
always go through the Commission.84 One exception to this rule is when the victim is a 
citizen of the country making the application to the Court. 
 
A demonstration of the above dilemma through a hypothetical case may help to clear out 
some points. Assume a victim “V” is a citizen of country “C” and resides in country “R” 
where she/he faced a serious violation of his protected rights. Suppose also that all the 
countries are States Parties to the Charter while country “N” neighbouring both countries is 
a party to the Protocol too. We will now look at the riddle by changing the constant bases. 
 
The defendant in this case is going to be country “R”. The victim “V” cannot bring a case 
against “R” unless the country has made a declaration to accept the Court’s power in such a 
case. Yet, both country “C” and country “N” can bring cases against “R” as an inter-state 
complaint case. Country “R” can only bring the case to the Court only after it took the case 
to the Commission. It is only when the Commission’s recommendation is not welcomed by 
the violating state that this country should take the case to the Court. Adding to that, “N” 
cannot take a case directly to the Court for “V” is not its own citizen. Country “C” can have 
                                                 
83 Supra note 25, Article 5(2) 
84Supra note 25,  Articel 5(1)b 
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access to the Court in two instances. First, it can bring a case against “R” by itself with out 
first taking a complaint to the Commission as the victim is its citizen.85 Country “C” can 
also have access to the Court as an interested party after a case is brought by country “R”. 
This might be a result of two things. Firstly, “C” might be hesitant to bring a case against 
“R” for fear of its diplomatic relations. In this case after the case is brought by “N”, there 
could be a change in ideology or a change of regime in country “C” that pushes such a 
country to be concerned about the violation and request for joinder. Secondly, by the time 
the violation occurs, “C” might not be a state party to the additional Protocol. Thus, “C” 
might ratify the Protocol at a latter date and might need to be joined in the case as it was 
not legally possible for the state to do it before. 
 
2.3 AFRICAN INTER GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
African intergovernmental organisations are entitled to access the Court by submitting 
cases to the Court as are the Commission and State Parties to the Protocol. 
Intergovernmental organisations are associations that have sovereign states as parties to its 
formation. The intergovernmental organisations are those already created and those that 
will be created. Thus the UN, AU, EU, OAS are some of the intergovernmental 
organisations. It is not all the intergovernmental organisations that are allowed to access the 
Court.86 The prefix to the term intergovernmental organisations reads as ‘African’.87 An 
African intergovernmental organisation means an organisation of the African states. This 
will right away exclude the consideration of some intergovernmental organisations which 
does not have African states as a member such as the EU and OAS. 
 
The African Union would be the first institution that could be mentioned as a proper 
intergovernmental organisation.88 The fact that the organisation is made up of only African 
                                                 
85 See supra note 25, Article 5(1)c 
86Supra note 25,  Article 5(1)e 
87Supra note 25, Article 5 (1)e 
88 Supra note 25, Article 5(1)e 
 33
states entitles it to be considered as such. Thus intergovernmental organisations which are 
made of African States are entitled to access the Court by taking a case. Apart from the 
AU, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, the African Development Bank, the 
African Development Fund, the African Regional Economic Associations and other 
regional organisations do also fall in the category. The intergovernmental organisations that 
are made of the states of the African Union are hence welcome to access the Court. 
 
However, a question could be raised if an international organisation such as the UN or a 
regional organisation which includes a country such as Morocco, a country in Africa but 
not a member to the African Union would be allowed to take a case to the Court. Some 
international organisations such as the UN have African states as members. The wording in 
Article 5(1) e does not seem to allow such organisations. The prefix in the provision 
denotes only African states should be a member to the intergovernmental organisation. The 
UN for example has all African states as members to it plus other countries too. Thus it 
does not make the grades up to the requirement set under the Protocol to access the Court 
as an intergovernmental organisation.  
 
The other puzzle that comes here is if intergovernmental organisations that have members 
which are not in the African Union can access the Court. Morocco is neither a state party to 
the African Union nor the African Human Rights Charter. The African Human Rights 
Charter and the Court’s Protocol are made up under the auspicious of the African Union. 
As a result the usage of the word African in the Protocol should be construed to mean states 
that are members to the African Union. 
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3 OPTIONAL ACCESS AND ADMISSIBILITY 
 
3.1 OPTIONAL ACCESS TO INDIVIDUALS AND NGOs 
 
There have been two functioning regional Courts before the African Court’s Protocol came 
into reality. The European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court are not on 
the same plane when it comes to access by individuals and NGOs. The former has 
leapfrogged most international or regional tribunals by making access to individuals and 
NGOs compulsory.89 On the contrary, the latter has made the Court inaccessible for 
individuals and citizens to bring a case directly before the Court. The African Protocol has 
taken a mid-way position with respect to individual and NGO access by making optional 
access a possibility in the Protocol.  
 
3.1.1 Individual access 
 
An individual may submit a communication to the African Commission of Human Rights. 
There is no explicit address made about individual complaints in the African Charter. 
Article 55 of the Charter uses the phrase ‘other communications’ to differentiate it from 
State communications.90 Communications from individuals are accepted under the Charter 
automatically. The State does not need to make any additional declaration apart from mere 
                                                 
89European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by 
Protocol No. 11 with Protocol numbers 1, 4 , 6, 7, 12 and 13, available at,  < 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf> Visited on 26 February 2006.,   Article 34. 
90 Supra note 25, Article 47-54 of the Charter are rules on State Communications. And ‘Other 
Communications’ have been interpreted and applied by the Commission as complaints from individuals or 
NGOs. 
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ratification of the Charter to allow an individual access the Commission. Thus individuals, 
whether or not they are victims, are allowed to access the Commission without any 
restriction.91
 
In a stark contrast to the Charter, the access to the African Human Rights Court by 
individuals is limited through the additional Protocol.92 The issue of individual complaints 
was the subject of a heated debate in the drafting process of the Protocol.93 As it stands, it 
takes more than just ratification for a state to allow individuals access the Court. Provisions 
under Article 5 and Article 36 of the Protocol make reference on how such a 
communication could be submitted. Article 5(3) of the Protocol indicates that the Court 
may entitle individuals to institute cases before the Court only when the conditions that are 
set under Article 34(6) are fulfilled.94  
 
Article 36 lays two-way restrictions on such complaints. First, the State has to make a 
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to receive individual complaints.95 
Second, when an application is forwarded to the Court against a particular state that has not 
provided the required declaration, the Court has to refuse receipt of it.96 The two sentences 
under Article 34(6) have more or less the same meaning. It only shows the emphasis given 
to the expressed consent of a state in accepting the Court’s power to consider complaints 
from individuals.97 Thus it is, predominantly if not solely, the will of the states to allow 
individuals to access the Court. 
 
The hurdle that is set under Article 34(6) on individual access is not something that should 
be welcomed ecstatically, however, it should not be considered as a hopeless case as states 
                                                 
91 Makau Mutua ‘The African Human Rights Court: A two-legged stool?’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly. 
P.346 
92 Supra note 25, Articles 5(3) and 34(6). 
93 Rachel Murray ’A Comparison between the African and European Courts of Human Rightss’ (2002) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal. P. 201 
94 Supra note 25, Article 5. 
95 Supra note 25, Article 36(4) 
96 Supra note 25, Article 36(4) 
97 It does not seem that there is a lee way for a case to be accepted by the Court if only one of the two 
statements were there.  
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may make a declaration at any time subsequently.98 In fact, most international procedures 
under the UN and other international or regional tribunals have a restrictive approach in the 
case of individual access. Yet, it is regrettable that the provision does not indicate the 
current level of development on the subject.99 At least the way the provision was designed 
should not have been as easy as it is, for states can do away with individual complaints 
mechanism by just being passive.100 It is believed that optional complaints would call for a 
number of states to ratify the Protocol101 and it also respects the sovereignty of the 
potential states that could be a party to the Protocol.102 It should be noted that such a 
cautious compromise was really unnecessary103 as the time for states to hide back in the 
shield of sovereignty for a human rights violation is long over due. It is a pity that the 
progressive rules of the African Charter that allow individuals unfettered access is held 
back in the Protocol. It is obvious that African states, which are often in the forefront when 
it comes to human rights violations, may look keen to reduce the number of cases brought 
against them by reducing the number of complaints, which is the efficient way of doing 
so.104 Yet, the general attitude of African States was not an exclusive factor for the 
regressive nature of individual access to the Court compared to that of the African 
                                                 
98 Frans Viljoen ‘ A Human Rights Court for Africa and Africans’ (2004/2005) 30 Brook. J. Int’l L. 38 
It should be noted that more than thirty African states that ratified the African Human Rights Charter have 
also ratified the First Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that allows 
individuals to submit complaints to the Human Rights Committee. See The United Nations Human Rights 
Treaties, “Status of Ratification: CCPR Optional Protocol” in 
<http://www.bayefsky.com/./pdf/ccpr_opt_ratif_table.pdf > visited April 12, 2006. 
99 The European Convention on Human Rights automatically allows individuals to submit cases to the Court. 
100 The provision should have been designed in a manner that requires states to work a little when they decide 
not to accept the individual complaints mechanism. It would have been better if ratification were to make an 
automatic acceptance of the Court’s competence to consider individual complaints; and States were allowed 
to make a declaration not to accept it. 
101 Supra note 91, p. 355. 
102 Supra note 7. 
103 Nsongura J. Udombana ’An African Human Rights Court and An African Union Court: A Neeedful 
Duality or A Needless Duplication?’ (2002/2003) Brook. J. Int’l L. 28. p.830  
104 Julia Harrington ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2005) p. 320 from Malcolm D. 
Evans and Rachel Murray, (eds.) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in 
Practice, 1986-2000. 
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Charter.105 The major explanation for this is just a ‘historical accident’106 and that ‘drafters 
appeared to have been too timid, like a frightened beast shying at its own shadow’107. 
 
Be it as it may, the provision that resulted out of the drafters’ debate emulates the approach 
held under Article 25 of the previous European Convention on Human Rights.108 Thus a 
separate declaratory statement accepting the competence of the Court should be there so 
that the Court is seized with a power to adjudicate an individual’s case. Generally, the 
declaration is made to accept the competence of the Court to consider cases against the 
state indefinitely i.e. at any time and on any case. However, the declaration that states may 
make in this instance could also be for the purpose of a specific case or a specific period.109 
Such specific declarations could be important in the protection of rights though states 
should generally be encouraged to make a declaration without qualification.110 While 
securing a declaration from African states is quite difficult111, it is worrisome if there is 
another hurdle that should be crossed to access the Court. 
 
A close reading of article 5(3) would tempt one to ask whether or not a declaration suffices 
for the purpose. Article 5(3) reads ‘the Court may entitle…..individuals’ which would put 
one in a dilemma and ponder the question whether or not there is additional requirement for 
the Court to consider after article 34(6) is fulfilled.112 A plain reading of the provision 
seems to show that there is a pivotal role that the Court will play in the right of individual’s 
access once the relevant states have made a declaration. The usage of the phrase mentioned 
                                                 
105 Supra note 104. 
106 Supra note 104. 
107 See supra note 103. 
108 Article 25 of the previous European Convention on Human Rights, Done at Strasbourg, this 20th day of 
January 1966. 
109 Viljoen describes that a case specific declaration needs as a prerequisite the interest of the individual; yet 
NGOs also could have an interest in such ratification. He informs that a period specific declaration should be 
discouraged for fear that it will invite regression and uncertainty. See also Article 46(2) of the previous 
ECHR. See also Article 62(2) of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. 
110 The Protocol does not have an explicit rule on a limited declaration. As it is not prohibited one may take 
that it is allowed. 
111 Only Burkina Faso has made a declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction to date. 
112 Supra note 25, Articles 5(3) and 34(6). 
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in the first part of the italics note (i.e. ‘the Court may entitle’), does not put everybody in 
congruence as to what it means and needs a consideration.  
 
Writing about the shortcomings of the African Human Rights Court on the limitation of 
access imposed by the Protocol, Mutua asserts that there is another condition on top of a 
declaration in the following manner;113
Individuals and NGOs cannot bring a suit against a State unless two conditions are met. First, the 
Court will have discretion to grant or deny such access. Second, at the time of ratification of 
the…Protocol or thereafter the state must have made a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
Court to hear such cases. 
 
The same line of thinking is also expounded by Udombana as follows.114
[T]he discretion to give individuals and NGOs standing lies jointly with the Court and the target 
State. On the one hand, the Court has discretion to grant or deny an individual and NGO standing at 
will. The language of the Protocol is: Court may entitle [;]…and, in order for a willing Court to hear 
a case filed by an individual or NGO, the state must have made an express declaration accepting the 
Court’s jurisdiction to hear such cases.     
 
As it is described above, cumulative fulfilment of the two conditions is a prerequisite for an 
individual to have access to the Court. The order of the conditions should, nevertheless, be 
switched over. As such, the first requirement is that there should be ratification with a 
declaration to it. Then, the Court will be authorized to use its discretion.  
   
The joint hurdle in the process is quite visible from a plain reading of the provision in the 
Protocol. As a result, it is not difficult to find writers who subscribe to the above thesis.115 
However, Frans Viljoen puts a check to the above, apparently plain argument in the 
following manner;116
                                                 
113 Supra note 91, p.355. 
114 Supra note 103. 
115 See for ex. Robert Wundeh Eno ‘The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’(2002)  Vol. 2 NO 2 African Human Rights Law Journal p. 229-230. 
116 Supra note 98, p. 40 
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[the] discretionary language is rooted in the drafting history of the Protocol and was introduced 
when direct access was at the African Court’s discretion. However, since direct access became 
subject to an optional State declaration, the drafters’ failure to remove the language appears to be a 
mere oversight. Therefore, the provision should be interpreted to place authorization for direct 
access with in the sole domain of the state parties” 
 
The same line of argument is also supported by Ouguergouz, one of the judges elected for 
the Court, who argues as follows.117
Attention should be drawn to a small ambiguity in Article 5(3). What indeed, is the meaning of the 
expression “The Court may entitle”? This form of words would suggest that the Court’s jurisdiction 
is not automatic and that bringing a case before it depends upon its discretionary power. Yet the 
reference to Article 34 (6) confirms that the only condition on bringing a case in this way is the 
deposit of a declaration of acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court by the State concerned…. 
Ultimately, there was no need to stipulate that the “Court may entitle” non-governmental 
organisations and individuals to institute cases directly before it; such permission falls within the 
sole domain of States parties to the Protocol.  
 
These views that argue the discretionary power of the Court as an oversight are not with 
out support in the drafting history of the Protocol which is the basis for the assertion. 
According to the analysis, it appears that the inclusion of the phrase ‘the Court may entitle’ 
in the provision should be disregarded. Apparently it was included to put a check to a flood 
of cases when there was an automatic right of individuals to submit a case in the draft 
Protocols. Yet the phrase slipped into the final one though individual access is provided to 
be optional.  
 
True that some of the draft Protocols, which were in place before the final Protocol, have 
put an automatic access to the Court. The International Committee of Jurists (ICJ) draft has 
put that ‘the Court may, on exceptional grounds, authorise persons, non-governmental 
organisations and groups of individuals to bring cases before the Court’ automatically.118 
The Cape Town draft Protocol too has put that individuals should be allowed to access the 
                                                 
117 Supra note 77, p. 724. 
118 See Article 20(1) of the International Committee of Jurists Draft Protocol on the ACtHPR. 
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Court automatically using the same wording mentioned under the ICJ draft Protocol.119 
The Nouakchott draft Protocol uses same introductory words as the final draft and the final 
Protocol. It says ‘the Court may entitle NGOs with observer status before the Commission 
and individuals to institute directly before it, urgent cases or serious, systematic or massive 
violations of human rights.’120 This draft Protocol has made the access by individuals 
optional by making a separate declaration as a requirement.121 Finally, the Addis Ababa 
draft Protocol, which is adopted latter, took similar notion with the Nouakchott draft to take 
up the optional approach of individual access.122  
 
Accordingly, it is indisputable that the two drafts, which were there until before the 
Nouakchott one, opted for a direct access by individuals without any need for a state to 
make a separate declaration. In such an arrangement, it is not difficult to imagine that it is 
proper for the Court to be seized with a discretionary power to decide which cases should 
be submitted. It would be possible for the Court to be flooded with a lot of cases at some 
time. A discretionary power in such a case would allow the Court to decide on which cases 
it should take and hence on the number and type of cases it may look. It is a last minute 
substitution that blew all and resulted in the current, apparently ambiguous, provision. 
Nevertheless, it is very difficult to aptly say that it was an inadvertent inclusion. Perhaps, 
the drafters, who happened to hold another view, in the last minute were also convinced 
that the discretionary power of the Court be still intact even though they knew the final 
Protocol has an optional approach to individual complaints.123  
                                                 
119 See Article 6(1) of the Cape Town Draft Protocol on the ACtHPR. 
120 See Article 6(1) of the Nouakchott Draft Protocol on the ACtHPR. 
121 See Article 6(5) of the Nouakchott Draft Protocol on the ACtHPR 
122 The Addis Ababa draft Protocol (1997) and the Final Protocol (1998) are identical. 
123The last draft was made in Addis Ababa in 1997 and it was adopted as the final Protocol in 1998. 
The process which led the provision on the ‘discretionary power’ of the Court and the optional approach of 
the individual access to be adopted as it appears is described in the following manner; 
“After a prolonged debate over two sessions, these articles were reformulated and submitted for 
consideration and adoption by the meeting.  They were, thereafter, adopted by consensus on the 
strength of the commitment expressed by delegates toward ensuring that the Court be an effective 
instrument in the protection of human rights in Africa.” 
See University of Pretoria, Centre for Human Rights, “Documents Leading up to the Establishment of the 
African Court” in 
<http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre_publications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS%20LEADING%20UP%20TO
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 Consequently, the situation as to how this confusion should be cleared is not easy. 
While the points mentioned above asserting the inclusion of the phrase that empowers 
the Court with a discretionary power as unintentional may look logical, one cannot be 
certain that the Court will follow this line of argument. The terms of a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith by giving ordinary meaning to it in the light of its context, 
object and purpose.124 It is difficult to apply this line of interpretation and claim that the 
addition of the phrase is not anticipated. A pure and simple reading along with general 
rules of treaty interpretation explains that the Court is empowered with a discretionary 
power of determining which cases it should consider. One can not totally do away with 
the phrase and argue that it does not have any meaning. The will of the drafters is 
expressed in the terms they use in the treaty and they have included it in the treaty as 
part of the adopted Protocol apparently after some discussion. This is a serious blow 
and one of the grave shortcomings that the new Protocol has come up with.  
 
Nonetheless, one of the things that the drafters should be praised for is the fact that there is 
no victim requirement in the Protocol for submitting a case. The African human rights 
Court has leapfrogged its counter parts by not making the victim an inextricable 
requirement in the consideration of cases submitted by individuals. The European Court 
rules relating to capacity and standing are not restrictive, but their mandatory linkage to the 
requirement of victim makes the task cumbersome.125 No additional declaration on the part 
of a state is required apart from ratification in Europe for an individual to access the 
Court.126 The non existence of this limitation on the African Court may allow an individual 
who is not a victim to access the Court. It can rightly be argued that this might be the 
reason for the drafters to leave the discretionary power as it was, so that the Court would 
                                                                                                                                                    
%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%20OF%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p.170.doc> visited 6 
April, 2006. 
124 Supra note 37, Article 31. 
125 Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
ed. (2005) p.114-115 
126 See supra note 34. 
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determine which cases it should consider. By way of which, the Court may make some 
consistent rules on how it should treat victims and non-victims. 
 
Ultimately it is for the Court to decide whether or not it has a discretionary power. The 
positive aspect here is that the Court has a competence to ascertain its jurisdiction as it 
may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction.127 Although research on it and 
scholarly writings will definitely have an impact on how the Court will exercise its 
power, the line of thinking the Court will follow is yet to be determined.  The judges of 
the Court are the final arbiters on the issue and the quality and independence of judges 
will have a vibrant role in it.128 The writer of this paper is optimistic that the judges will 
tend to interpret the provision for the benefit of the greater good.129 The judges should 
be judicially active in their interpretations and foster the better protection of rights in 
Africa. 
 
3.1.2 Non-governmental organisations 
 
The discussion that was made here in above in connection with individual access also holds 
true for NGOs. The previous discussion on individuals centres on Article 5(3) and Article 
34(6). These two provisions put the rules on how individuals and NGOs can have access to 
the Court and make reference to one another. The words individual and NGOs are used just 
once under Article 5(3) and they are connected by the conjunction ‘and’.130 As a result, it 
should be well-known that the explanation on individual access is also an explanation for 
NGOs. It is for the sake of convenience in treating their peculiar traits that this discussion is 
made separately. Thus, the following analysis will not repeat on what has already been 
said, but will ponder on what type of NGOs are allowed to access the Court.  
                                                 
127 Supra note 25, Article 3(2) 
128 Supra note 25, Articles 11 and 17.  
129 Supra note 25, Article 11 of the Protocol indicates that the judges are ‘jurists of high moral character and 
of recognised practical, judicial or academic competence and experience in the field of human and peoples’ 
rights’. It should be easy for this level of judges to have a position which will guarantee the better protection 
of rights in Africa. 
130 Supra note 25, Article 5 (3). 
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 The African Human Rights Charter does not lay any restriction on the type of NGOs that 
may submit cases to the Commission.131 The Charter lays nothing that could prohibit 
NGOs from submitting cases to the Commission. While there has never been any 
restriction on the kind of NGOs that may submit cases to the Commission, the Court’s 
Protocol has devised some limitation. Thus, after everything that qualifies an individual to 
access the Court is complete, there still is a condition on which NGOs should submit a case 
to the Court. The European Convention does not put any restriction on the type of NGO 
that may access the Court.132
 
The type of NGOs that could access the Court are confined by the terms under Article 5(3). 
It is only those 'NGOs with observer status before the Commission’ that are given the 
mandate to access the Court. Like individuals, NGOs need not be a victim of a human 
rights violation to bring a case against a particular State. Yet, during the drafting process, 
some delegates actually wanted to confer the right only to African NGOs.133 The final draft 
(the Protocol) does not show this and African or other international NGOs can access the 
Court. Nonetheless, only the NGOs that have been granted an observer status by the 
Commission are allowed to access the Court.134  
 
The access to NGOs is arguably limited by the prefix ‘relevant’. Seconding that it appears 
companies and trade unions are not covered as parties having standing merely because they 
do not qualify as NGOs. In the European Court these entities have been allowed to access 
the Court in different circumstances.135 It totally depends on whether these entities are 
                                                 
131 Article 55 is framed to show the type of Communication i.e. ‘other communications’ can be submitted by 
whoever wants to make the application. 
132 No particular status is attached to the NGOs under Article 34 of the European Convention; however, it is 
encumbered with being a victim. 
133 Dr. Ibrahim Ali Badawi El.Sheikh, ’Draft Protocol to the African charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Introductory Note’ (1997) African 
Journal of Int’l and Comparative Law. Vol. 9 P.947 
134 There are more than 300 NGOs, both African and International, which have the necessary observer status. 
See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “Directory of NGOs with observer status”, < 
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/directory_ngo_en.html > Visited 24 January 2006. 
135 Supra note 125, p.116-117. 
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considered as NGOs with observer status primarily by the African Commission; which is 
unlikely.136 Even if they are considered as NGOs, it is difficult to determine which NGOs 
are relevant and which are not relevant and the purpose of the prefix is ambiguous. The 
judges in the Court once again should interpret it progressively for the greater good in the 
protection of human rights. The Court should be judicially active here to bolster the 
protection of human rights in the continent. 
 
 
3.2 ADMISSIBILITY OF APPLICATIONS 
 
One of the procedural requirements that affect the consideration of a case in any court is 
the admissibility of a case. Admissibility means acceptability or the act of properly 
receiving a certain case and its consideration in a legal proceeding. The African Human 
Rights Courts criteria for admissibility are laid down under Article 6 of the additional 
Protocol.  Article 6 of the Protocol, which is entitled ‘Admissibility of Cases’, is one of the 
provisions poorly drafted.137 Hence, the uncertainties that arise from the vagueness of the 
provision are presumed to be cleared in the Rules of Procedure that the Court will make.138
 
The African Charter on Human Rights deals with admissibility of cases in two provisions. 
It deals with it in connection with the two sets of groups that have access to the 
Commission. Thus there is a requirement in connection with communications from States 
and other Communications.139  In the case of the former there is only one requirement laid 
down. The Commission should deal with the case after ascertaining that all the available 
local remedies are exhausted, unless there is a prolonged process of achieving this.140 The 
criteria laid in connection with the second group of Communications are much more 
detailed and rigorous than the first one. In addition to the inclusion of the single 
                                                 
136 No such entity has been considered as one having observer status by the African Commission. 
137 Supra note 77, P. 729 
138 Supra note 77, p.734 
139 Supra note 11, Articles 50 and 56. 
140 Supra note 11, Article 50. 
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requirement of State Communications as one141, the admissibility requirement for Other 
Communications lays six more criteria. This provision is specifically referred to in the 
Court’s Protocol.  
 
Article 6(1) of the Protocol deals with a general condition of admissibility and the second 
sub-article lays down specific criteria by way of referring to the Charter. The first sub-
article makes a general reference to Article 5(3) by saying “The Court, when deciding on 
admissibility of a case instituted under article 5(3) of this Protocol …” Article 5(3) is a 
provision that speaks how individuals and NGOs have access to the Court. As a result it is 
palpable to understand that the rules on admissibility are applicable when a case is lodged 
from an NGO with a duly authorized observer status or an individual entitled to submit a 
case before the Court.142.  
 
There is no rule in the Protocol that regulates how cases submitted from entities other than 
the ones mentioned here can pass the admissibility test or even if there is one attached to 
them. The European Convention puts a general rule of admissibility for both individuals or 
NGOs and States.143  The same is true in the case of the African Charter which puts 
exhaustion of local remedies as a general criterion of admissibility.144 However, the 
provisions of the Protocol do not express anything to that effect with respect to entities 
other than NGOs and individuals. It leaves a big lacuna which unless filled, will result in 
the congestion of the Court and adversely affect the proper handling of cases in other 
institutions.  
 
 It would be naive to ascertain that there is no admissibility requirement on all ‘persons’ 
such as States in the African Court for example. Would the Court then consider an inter-
state complaint which is being handled by another international tribunal or even by the 
Commission? An affirmative answer to this would leave the Court in a position where it 
                                                 
141 Supra note 11Article 56(5). 
142 Supra note 25, Articles 5(3) and 6(1). 
143 Supra note 89, Article 35(1); the next provision puts specific rules on the admissibility of cases from 
individuals and NGOs.  
144 Supra note 11, Article 50. 
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could find itself involved in the affairs of others or mar a proceeding in another tribunal. As 
a result, the fact that there is no expressed rule on admissibility does not mean that the 
Court is prohibited from considering one. At least it was not prohibited in the Protocol and 
at most it is necessary. It should only be attributed to a poor drafting of the Protocol, which 
on this case can be filled up through the Rules of Procedure.  
 
Be that as it may, the Court rules on admissibility of a case, submitted to it, by taking into 
account the provisions of Article 56 of the Charter. This provision of the Charter sets forth 
the conditions for admissibility of Communications addressed to the African Commission 
on Human Rights.145 The conditions of admissibility as put under Article 56 are the 
following. 
 
The applicant must not be anonymous. There could be cases where an individual applicant 
may want to hide his identity for fear of persecution; however, this rule prohibits the 
lodging of applications for purely political and propagandistic reasons.146 The application 
should be compatible with the AU act, the African Charter and of course with the Protocol; 
it should not be written in disparaging languages against AU, and should not be based on 
news discriminated through the mass media. The Communication should exhaust remedies 
which are available, effective and sufficient.147  
 
The Charter puts the exhaustion of local remedies requirement as a prerequisite for both 
State Communications and ‘Other Communications’. The application should be submitted 
with in a reasonable period of time after exhausting local remedies.148 Thus any decision 
previously made could not be challenged after a lapse of a reasonable period. Finally, the 
Court should not accept a case which has been settled according to the UN Charter, the AU 
                                                 
145 Supra note 25, Article 6(2 ); and Supra note 11, Article 56. 
146 Milena Petkovic, The admissibility conditions regarding procedures before the European Court of Human 
Rights (Det Juridiske fakultet: Universitetet Bergen) 2003. P. 14 
147 Henry Onoria, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the exhaustion of local 
remedies under the African charter. African Human Rights Law Journal Vol 3 No 1 (2003) p. 1-24 
148 The equivalent requirement in the European Court sets a fixed six month date.  
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act, the provisions of the African Charter and its Protocols. This requirement of 
admissibility is a judicial security that makes decisions duly made res judicata.149
 
These conditions will thus be applicable to cases which are brought before the Court 
predominantly on individual and NGO applications. As mentioned elsewhere, there is no 
specific requirement of ‘victim’ alluded to the admissibility issue. In deciding on 
admissibility, the Court is also entitled to request the opinion of the Commission before 
ruling on the admissibility of a case.150 Apart from this, the provision on admissibility in 
the Protocol depicts that, the Court is free to ‘consider a case or to transfer it to the 
Commission’ irrespective of any decision that the Court may have on the basis of the 
specific criteria.151 There is no criterion provided as to the circumstances under which the 
Court may retain original jurisdiction or transfer the case to the Commission.152 Moreover, 
the rule does not describe when and how it should be done. Once more, the Rules of 
Procedure will hopefully deal with it in a detailed manner and fill the lacuna that is vivid in 
this provision. It will be up to the Court to make the Rules of Procedure which effectively 
fill the gaps in the Protocol and strive for an efficient and effective procedure. 
 
                                                 
149 Supra note 77, p.613 
150 Supra note 25, Article 6 (1) 
151 Supra note 25, Article 6 (3). 
152 Nsongurua Udombana, the African regional human rights court modeling its rules of procedure, Academic 
Literature, Danish Centre for Human Rights (2002) P.97 
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4 THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The term jurisdiction is synonymous to authority or power. But the question is power of 
what or authority over what? Jurisdiction “in its pure sense refers to the authority to declare 
the law or the legal position, i.e., to pronounce on rights and obligations.”153 The issue of 
jurisdiction is a matter raised as a preliminary objection, hence it requires a solution before 
the court indulges on the merits of the case as is the case with admissibility.154 Any Court 
that presides over a given case has to answer the issue of jurisdiction either implicitly or 
expressly. A denial of jurisdiction, however, should always be expressed. 
The jurisdiction of a Court is delimited in the establishing instrument. The document may 
empower the court or the tribunal with a broad or narrow area of jurisdiction. Be it as it 
may, the question of jurisdiction under international courts155 can be broken down into the 
following components.156
- whether it has been properly established 157 
- La competence de la competence; (to assume jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction) 
- Competence (jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction over the person and 
jurisdiction to render the particular judgment) 
                                                 
153 Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe Jurisdiction of International Tribunals (2003) Kluwer Law International: 
The Hague, London, NewYork P.52 
154 Prosecutor V. Dusco Tadic; ICTY: Judicial Reports 1994-1995 at P. 365. The Court here was challenged 
with jurisdictional questions in the trial chamber. The appeal chamber has given an interlocutory decision 
over the following issues: a) illegal foundation of the International Tribunal; b) wrongful primacy of the 
International Tribunal over national courts; and c) lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae. 
155 Supra note 154. In the Tadic case the court declared that a narrow concept of jurisdiction may, perhaps, be 
warranted in a national context but not in international context. As such it asserted that the international 
tribunal has also the power to determine the validity of the international tribuanal. 
156 The subordinate areas mentioned are taken from analysis of:  Cornell Law School, “Jurisdiction: an 
overview” < http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/jurisdiction.html >, visited on 24 February, 2006 and 
Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe: Supra note 153. P 65 
157 Supra note 154 
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The jurisdiction of the African Court is articulated under three topics. First, the Court has 
contentious jurisdiction; it adjudicates disputes concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Charter, the Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument 
ratified by the states concerned.158 Second, it has advisory jurisdiction; it has a power to 
give advisory opinion to any state party to the African Union, the African Union, any of its 
organs, or any African organization recognized by the union on any legal matter related to 
human rights issues.159Third, the Court has conciliatory jurisdiction; it may try to reach an 
amicable settlement in a case pending before it in accordance with the provisions of the 
human rights Charter.160  
These three sets of jurisdiction are not specified under one title, and only the dispute 
settlement area has a title of the provision that reads “jurisdiction”.161 The two others have 
a title of “advisory opinion” and “amicable settlement”. This does not, however, make 
them the subject they are dealing with has got nothing to do with the issue of jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, some eminent human rights commentators do not even discuss the third point 
as an issue of jurisdiction. Nmehielle, for example, discusses only contentious and advisory 
jurisdiction; and does not discuss about the issue of amicable settlement in his title that 
deals with “jurisdiction and access to court”.162 Udombana comparing the African Court 
with other regional courts noted that “the African Court is bestowed with both contentious 
and advisory jurisdiction”163 On the other hand, other prominent writers describe the power 
of the Court as a three level jurisdiction. Mugwanya describes the jurisdiction of the 
African Court as “invested with three heads of jurisdiction namely: contentious, 
conciliatory and advisory”.164Eno also writes that the protocol provides for the three 
jurisdictional heads of adjudication, advisory and conciliatory.165
                                                 
158 Supra note 25, Article 3. 
159 Supra note 25, Article 4. 
160 Supra note 25, Article 9. 
161 Supra note 25, Articles 4 and 9. 
162 Vincent O. Orlu Nmehielle, Supra note 6,  p. 263 
163 Nsongurua J. Udombana Supra note 103,   p42 
164 George William Mugwanya: Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights Through the African 
Regional Human Rights System, Transnational Publishers: Newyork, 2003 p.322 
165 Robert Wundeh Eno “The jurisdiction of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights”(2002) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal 2 P. 225. 
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Most of the literature on the jurisdiction of the African human rights Court deals with what 
is called the ordinary jurisdiction of a court; its contentious or adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
Most of them discuss the broad scope of the Court’s contentious subject matter 
jurisdiction.166 It is considered as a strong arm of the Court for the protection and 
enforcement of human rights. The part of the Protocol that describes this very idea of 
broader scope of jurisdiction is not found in other regional systems of human rights and is 
sometimes called as innovative and very important as it is a mechanism to enforce the 
wider body of international treaty law.167
 Naldi and Magliveras describe article 3(1) of the Protocol that defines the contentious 
jurisdiction of the Court as one that extends power over any treaty which impinged on 
human rights in Africa.168 Mugwanya in his analysis of the question, whether or not the 
Court’s jurisdiction extends to treaties that are not principally human rights treaties but 
merely contain an additional human rights dimension, argues in the affirmative.169 The 
same line of thinking is followed by Nmehielle. He argues that the broad scope of the 
Court’s jurisdiction has the potential of extending over any treaty dealing with issues of 
human rights applicable in Africa, including those treaties which are not predominantly of 
human rights treaties but in one way or another mention human rights issues.170
The broader scope of the human rights Court jurisdiction is not without challenge, though 
minimally. Heyns fiercely argues that the above argument brings the end of the pretence 
about the unique feature of human rights in Africa and “would amount to unconditional 
                                                 
166 For the analysis of the broad jurisdiction, See NJ Udombana “Towards the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: Better late than never” (2000) 3 Yale Human Right sand Development Law Journal 45 
167 See for example Vincent O. Orlu Nmehielle Supra note 6, p. 264. See also Gj Naldi & K. Magliveras 
“Reinforcing the African System of human rights: The Protocol on the Establishment of a Regional Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights” 16 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights p. 435 
168 Gj  Naldi & K. Magliveras Supra note 167, p. 435 
169 George William Mugwanya Supra note 164, p. 322.He mentions here the African Economic Commission 
Treaty, the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States.  
170 Vincent O. Orlu Nmehielle Supra note 6, p. 264 The examples he mentioned include UN treaties on 
human rights and even treaties which come in to effect in the future such as, an African Convention against 
Torture. 
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surrender to globalization and universalism in its pervasive sense.”171 This approach will 
cause jurisprudential chaos and uncertainties by making all human right treaties justiceable; 
which might deter states not only from ratification of the Protocol, but also from 
ratification of any human rights treaty.172
Heyns continues that the interpretation followed by the other group of writers is not 
warranted by a close reading of the protocol. He stresses that the word relevant in the 
phrase ‘other relevant treaties ratified by the state’ should be meticulously considered. As 
such he has submitted that173
the only treaties that could be potentially ‘relevant’ for the purposes of this provision [Article 3(1) 
of the protocol] would be treaties that make express provision for adjudication by African Human 
Rights Court. Because there are no ‘other’ treaties in existence today that contain such a provision, 
article 3(1) should be understood to leave such a possibility open in the future, for example to 
cover the situation where a Protocol to the African Charter on women’s rights could make 
provision for applicants to approach the African Human Rights Court. 
The Women’s Protocol which is designed to protect the rights of women to a greater level 
should not stand against the enforcement of human rights in general. The normative 
framework on human rights has already been achieved on the major human rights issues. 
The fact that there is a reference in the Women’s Protocol should be put as a reminder and 
a regulation that depicts the relationship between the Commission and the Court on the 
interpretation of the Women’s Protocol.174 Would there be any difference if the Women’s 
Protocol was silent on this issue? The answer seems to be in the negative. 
 
The two views on jurisdiction are contradictory in that one limits the Court’s jurisdiction to 
the application of those conventions that expressly empower the Court. While in the other, 
the Court is empowered to cover a broad range of human rights treaties. The issue of 
jurisdiction is a core item that identifies the Court’s real power in looking at the fulfillment 
of the objectives of the Court. The boundaries of human rights jurisdiction and its 
                                                 
171 Christof Heyns “The African Regional Human Rights System in need of Reform”(2001) 1 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 2 p.167. 
172  Supra note 171, p.166-167 
173 Supra note 171, p.167 
174 Supra note 14, Articles 27 and 32. 
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implication will be finely tuned and practically witnessed once the Court starts functioning. 
The final arbiter on the issue is going to be the Court. It should be noted that the Court’s 
interpretation of such provisions would hold back or strengthen the power of the Court in 
the protection of human rights. The Court should be judicially active in not limiting the 
power of the Court falling into a hairsplitting discussion on the interpretation of its 
provision. The object and purpose of the Protocol should be employed to broaden the 
protective mandate of the Court. It would be too difficult to totally fail the different 
arguments on the basis of argumentative logic. Both could be valid. It is in taking one of 
the possible arguments or making one of its own that the Court should be judicially active 
and put the broader protection of human rights as its basis for its decision. This line of 
argument is supported by the Protocol’s preamble which states the Protocol’s objective. As 
a result, the judges of the Court should not make their own law by way of interpretation, 
but by being with in the ambit of the law they should opt for and interpret it with a view 
that upholds the protection to greater level.  
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
 The African Human Rights Commission has been the sole mechanism created to supervise 
states compliance under the African human rights system. The Commission has an 
elaborate mandate for the promotion of human rights. However, it does not have sufficient 
powers for the protection of human rights in the region. The Charter or any other binding 
instrument has not provided that the Commission makes an enforceable and binding 
decision. Besides making mere recommendations, it does not have a mechanism to track 
and follow the effect of its decisions and see to it that there is compliance by the states with 
its decision. That is part of the reason that necessitates the creation of the African Court of 
Human Rights which will start to function some time in the future. 
 
The African Human Rights Court was created through Protocol which is already in force. 
Like any law, the Protocol has general rules which do not make one take extra effort to 
witness that there are lacunae in the provisions. This will be filled up and substantiated 
with the rules of procedure and the judgments. Both are tremendous jobs for the court 
judges to embark on. Furthermore, it is the Court’s role in defining the Protocol that could 
narrow or broaden the protection bestowed in it. Thus the effect of the protection 
mechanism and state’s compliance partly falls on the strength and activism of the Court. 
 
The following are considerable gaps that should be addressed in both the Rules of 
Procedure and the judgments: 
(1) the institutions that can access the Court are known but the procedure to access or 
how they can access is not clearly dealt with. 
(2) the access accorded to individuals and NGO’s is limited as it is an optional right of 
access. It is doubtful whether the Court has a say on who can access after a state 
makes a declaration for optional access. 
 54
(3) the criteria for admissibility is vague and it is doubtful if there is one on the states 
and institutions that are accorded the right of access. 
(4) the jurisdiction of the Court is not clearly stipulated. Whether the Court’s 
contentious jurisdiction encompasses the application of the whole body of human 
rights treaties is difficult to determine by just reading the provision.  
 
These all are central to the Court’s day to day activity and hence are not problems that the 
Court could function well without solving them properly. The way these problems are 
addressed should be of concern even before the Court is set to work. Ultimately, this lofty 
job in the protection of human rights falls on the judges of the Court. The judges of the 
Court should use the law and only the law in reaching a decision that would make the 
protection mechanism meaningful. The Court should not be bothered with ultra concerns 
that could demote the human rights protection to any level. Though it is too early to say 
that the African governments will interfere in the work of the Court and influence its 
decision, one cannot rule out the possibility.  
 
However, the Court should not bow to any political influence that might be exerted from 
African governments but rather concentrate on the legal instruments that gave it power. 
The Protocol is designed in a pertinent manner; and by trusting the system one should not 
doubt they will bow to some kind of influence. The process of election and the 
independence of the judges coupled with the quality of the judges are the highest standard 
measures of safeguard in a judicial system. An individual that makes to the office of 
judgeship in the Court is supposed to have the highest standard traits that are expected in a 
judge as per the Protocol and manifested in the election process. As such, eleven judges 
from eleven countries have passed the litmus to assume their position once the Court is set 
up. The writer of this paper is confident that these judges of the continent will pass any 
challenge to ascertain an effective protection of human rights in Africa.  
 
Two things are vividly presented here. First the Protocol that establishes the Court has got 
lacunae in different provisions, the interpretation of which could sway the protection 
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afforded in one way or another. Second, there are judges that are now elected in a system 
that guaranteed their independence and ensures their quality. These judges will be faced 
with setting up the ground work on the Court’s procedure. The Court has first to make the 
Rules of Procedure and also verify it in individual cases through its interpretation. As such 
it is the judges who will fill up the gap in the procedural rules of the Protocol. 
 
In doing so, the Court is not expected to make and cannot make a new law. It has to follow 
the rules of interpretation as set in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the 
document it self. Nevertheless, as has been said in the body of the paper, this might not 
show the way out in a situation where the provision is very doubtful and vague as is the 
case in many of the procedural provisions emphasized in this paper. And yet, the Court has 
to decide such a sensitive case timely in a manner that proves its quality and independence. 
With this background, the paper recommends that the Court should be vibrant in its 
decisions and be judicially active when making a rule. 
 
The judges will be in the middle of different, but validly pertinent, interpretations available 
on some cases or related to some of the provisions mentioned in the thesis. It is in these 
cases that the paper recommends the Court and the judges to be judicially active in 
upholding the broad perspective of human rights. The role of the Court is immense in 
ensuring that human rights are protected and in awarding remedies for violations. Its 
central role can be curbed back if the Court restrains itself in the process of making the 
Rules of Procedure and its interpretation of the provisions in applying it to specific cases. 
One should be confident on the high level judges and the system of their election, and hope 
that they would do what ever it takes to foster the human rights protection in the continent. 
For this, a proper role of judicial activism is expected from the judges in the process of 
setting up the Court’s procedural rules. As a result, the African Human Rights Court will 
emerge as a pillar and efficient protection mechanism and a hope for Africa. 
 
The protection of human rights in Africa is not a mere requirement of formality; it is a 
necessity that Africa has to work for, if its hope for prosperity, peace and stability is to 
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materialize. Africa’s development can only stride if human rights are well promoted and 
protected. It appears that the development of human rights has been demonstrated through 
the various instruments not least the Court’s Protocol. It is the Court’s strength that will 
foment the development of human rights by protecting the norms expressed through the 
different regional and human rights instruments.  
 
POSTSCRIPT 
 
The AU has welcomed the launching of the Court in its recent summit175 and has 
authorized the African Union Commission to convene a meeting of the Ministers of Justice 
on the Draft Protocol on the Statute of African Court of Justice and Human Rights.176 The 
meeting will discuss the outstanding issues in the Draft Protocol and submit its 
recommendation to the AU Council in January 2007, when the next regular summit is to be 
held.177 The AU has requested its members to give full support and ensure that the Court 
starts working as soon as possible and functions smoothly. This is a step forward by 
breaking the stalemate though it does not still tell when the Court will actually start to 
function.  
 
At the summit, the over all progress in human rights is expressed by the UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, in the following manner:178
[S]ome African leaders viewed human rights as a rich country's luxury for which 
Africa was not ready; that others treated it as an imposition, if not a plot, by the 
industrialized West…. 
I believe Africans have demonstrated that human rights are African rights.” 
 
The writer of this paper believes the Court will play a massive role in keeping the 
momentum by safeguarding the protection of human rights to a better level! 
                                                 
175 7th AU Summit, Banjul, the Gambia, 25 June-2 July 2006. 
176 Decision on the Draft Single Instrument on the Merger of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and the Court of Justice of the African Union, Doc Ex, Cl/253 (IX) 
177 Supra note 176. 
178 The Secretary-General Address to the African Union Summit, Banjul, 1 July 2006. 
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